A public good for onchain privacy.
A not-for-profit, self-hosted withdrawal relayer for Privacy Pools v2 on Ethereum mainnet. It lets someone withdraw a note to any recipient without funding that recipient with ETH for gas.
What this is
I built this as a not-for-profit, self-hosted withdrawal relayer for Privacy Pools v2 on Ethereum mainnet. It lets someone withdraw a note to any recipient without funding that recipient with ETH for gas. The relayer pays gas and broadcasts the transaction, while the withdrawal proof and fee commitment constrain what it can submit.
The frontend supports ETH, WETH, USDC and USDT. It also redeems ppETH, ppUSDC and ppUSDT through their published routers into ETH or the relevant stablecoin. This deployment supports Privacy Pools v2 only, not v1.
There are no user accounts, analytics, advertising trackers, percentage commissions or legacy flat fees. Quotes still include estimated gas and the published 0.00005 ETH safety buffer.
Why it exists
A withdrawal should not require the recipient to hold gas, create an account, or expose more metadata than necessary. I wanted to provide that infrastructure as a public good rather than make users depend on a closed relayer with unknown logging practices.
The source, deployment checks, operator configuration and privacy boundaries are public. Anyone can inspect the service rather than rely on a claim that it is private by design.
Transport choices
Normal browser origins default to HTTPS with Tor RPC. An onion page origin selects the exact onion gateway through ordinary Tor Browser networking. There is one API candidate and no automatic transport switching or fallback between these routes.
- Tor RPC: the default browser connection uses HTTPS to the VPS, so Caddy, the VPS and the hosting network see the user's IP. The relayer's RPC traffic then uses Tor with no direct RPC fallback. Application access logging is disabled, and the gateway strips identifying headers before forwarding to the relayer.
- Tor Browser: the relayer sees a Tor connection rather than the browser's IP. Wallet extensions, RPC providers and public chain data still have their own visibility.
IPFS gateways and the gwei name resolver are independent services. Fetching the static page through them can expose the reader's IP and the requested CID. That download is separate from relayer RPC traffic. A reliable HTTPS copy of the same HTML is also available.
Traffic and IP visibility
Follow the traffic: who can see your IP, payload and timing.-
Browser + wallet
Your wallet address can be visible to your wallet provider.
Your browser creates the proof locally.
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Gateway
Tor RPC: browser IP, payload, timing
Onion: Tor connection, payload, timing
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Relayer
Request payload, quotes, recipients, amounts, timing
No application IP logs or per-client rate-limit keys
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RPC via Tor
Calls, block ranges, transaction data, timing
Provider sees a Tor exit, not your IP
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Onchain
Recipient, amount, nullifier, relayer, fee address, time
Public, including sponsored by ben
Header stripping removes identifying headers, not the withdrawal payload itself. The gateway also sees that payload and its timing. Tor RPC exposes the browser IP to Caddy and the host. Onion hides the browser's network address. RPC providers still see request contents through their Tor exits.
What can be seen
Onchain
The recipient, asset, amount, nullifier, relayer signer, fee recipient, gas funding, transaction timing and yield route are public. The sponsored by ben calldata suffix is also public.
Address reuse, matching amounts, quick exits, wallet history and timing analysis can link deposits and withdrawals. The privacy review in the frontend points out some of these risks but cannot eliminate them.
The HTTPS edge and hosting network
With Tor RPC, Caddy terminates the browser's connection, so Caddy, the VPS and the hosting network see the browser's IP. The hosting provider can observe network traffic independently of application settings. Caddy access logging is disabled, and the gateway does not forward cookies, user-agent, origin or forwarded-IP headers to the relayer.
RPC and public-data providers
Relayer reads, gas estimation, simulations, receipt checks and transaction broadcasts use the Tor sidecar with no direct RPC fallback. RPC providers see a Tor exit, not the relayer host's direct IP, but they still see request contents, contract calls, block ranges, transaction bytes and timing. ASP and circuit-artefact providers see the public resources requested through their Tor exits.
Wallet extensions and the user's device
Wallet extensions have their own RPC, analytics and account APIs. The frontend cannot control that traffic. A connected wallet address is visible to the page and can link this session to earlier wallet activity.
Notes, account state and Merkle caches last only for this browser session. Encrypted account exports use PBKDF2-SHA256 and AES-256-GCM. Anyone who can decrypt an export can see and spend its notes. Circuit artefacts may be cached in IndexedDB; they are public files, not user notes.
What the application does not retain
The supplied configuration has no analytics, request IDs, IP-based rate-limit keys, user accounts, request database or persistent request log. Rate limits use global anonymous counters. Strict mode creates no application console or external alert log transports, and Docker logging is disabled for the relayer services.
Quote parameters, proofs, recipients, commitments, nullifiers, calldata and operational nonce state are processed in memory while serving requests. Duplicate withdrawal idempotency records expire after three minutes and are capped at 256 entries. In-flight locks, counters and queues are ephemeral. JavaScript cannot guarantee that every copy is wiped from memory.
Disconnecting the wallet module reloads the page and clears this tab's in-memory account and note session. It does not disconnect the wallet extension itself, and it does not delete encrypted exports or public circuit artefacts.
Fast Relay compared with this deployment
Fast Relay is 0xbow's hosted relayer for Privacy Pools. This project uses the same protocol contracts and proofs, so onchain visibility is not fundamentally different. Recipients, amounts, nullifiers, relayer addresses and transaction timings remain public in either model.
| Area | Fast Relay | This deployment |
|---|---|---|
| Connection edge | Public HTTPS endpoint receives a connection IP. | Tor RPC shows the browser IP to the public gateway. The explicit onion route shows a Tor connection instead of the browser's IP. |
| Application policy | no information | Request logging and IP-based rate-limit keys are disabled. Source and deployment checks are published. |
| Upstream traffic | no information | RPC reads, simulations, receipts and broadcasts use a Tor sidecar. The provider sees a Tor exit rather than the relayer host's direct IP, but still sees request contents and timing. |
| Fees | Live details currently report fixedFeeAmount of 21000 wei for supported assets. |
Zero fixed fee and a 50000000000000 wei (0.00005 ETH) gas buffer. |
Sources: 0xbow's Fast Relay configuration and 0xbow's live production relayer details.
Njalla and the VPS
Njalla is the VPS provider, not a privacy guarantee. Its official material describes privacy-oriented domain registration, Swedish VPS hosting, INCUS with a CEPH backend, and a 10 Gbps backbone.
Njalla can comply with valid government requests and can suspend the VPS for health or safety reasons. Root SSH access does not change that. Its infrastructure, storage, network and legal processes sit outside this deployment's source evidence.
I do not know whether Njalla stores IP logs for VPS traffic. Its public pages do not give a clear answer. Tor RPC lets it observe the browser's IP. Loading the frontend over public HTTPS or an IPFS gateway exposes the browser's IP to that service; an onion page uses the Tor Browser connection. Root SSH, disabled Caddy access logs and Tor upstream do not establish whether Njalla keeps logs.
Sources: About Njalla and Njalla's VPS details.
Fees and donations
This is a not-for-profit public good. There is zero percentage commission and zero legacy flat fee. Users pay the quoted gas estimate and published buffer.
Donations are optional and support gas and infrastructure for the public relayer:
For implementation and operational details, see the project README. For the precise source-evidence claims and their limits, see the privacy attestation.